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1 Introduction
Information systems (IS) are getting larger and more complex, becoming ‘gargantuan’.
IS practices have not evolved in step to handle the development and maintenance of
these gargantuan systems, leading to a variety of quality issues. The community recog‐
nises that they need to develop an appropriate organising architecture and are making
significant efforts [1]. Examples include the System Engineering Modeling Language
(SysML), the Reference Model for Open Distributed Processing (RM-ODP) and 4 + 1
Architectural Blueprints [2]. Most of these follow IEEE 1471-2000’s [3] recommenda‐
tion to use view models.
We believe that these efforts are missing a key component – an information grounding
view. In this paper, we firstly describe this view. Then we suggest a way to provide an
architecture for it – foundational ontologies – and a way of assessing them – metaphys‐
ical choices. We illustrate how the metaphysical choices are made and how this can affect
information modelling.
2 Information Grounding
The basic elements of the information grounding view are not new. It can be linked to
the discussion of a ‘Universe of Discourse’ (UoD) found as far back as Boole’s 1854
Laws of Thought [4]. The underlying idea is much older; that given some discourse there
is a collection of things the discourse is about, i.e. its UoD. In the IS community the
terminology was adopted for a different purpose (see e.g. ISO/TR 9007:1987 [5]). In
this, a pre-existing system (discourse) is seen as containing a ‘Universe of Discourse
Description’ (UoDD) which describes the UoD. What this suggests is that the informa‐
tion component of a new, yet-to-be-built, system can be developed by starting with its
UoD and describing this, building the UoDD from the UoD. This suggests an attractive
symmetry with models of a system; where a system model is a description of the system.
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And so the system model contains a description of a description of the UoD – creating
a chain of descriptions.
For our purposes, we will talk about an ‘information grounding’ rather than a
describing relation, where the elements of information in a system are grounded by the
things the information is about (or expressed in the language of truthmakers [6, 7], one
can say by the things that make them true). From this new perspective, the UoD is more
naturally called the ‘information ground’ of the system. This raises questions about
exactly what the UoDD is. Is it the model of the information ground – the information
ground model? Or is it the information in the system – the system information – which
is grounded by the information ground? From a grounding perspective these are
different; in the following sections we clarify this distinction.
There is a literature on the confusions that can arise around information grounding
relations. Korzybski [8] talks of confusing the map with the territory. 20th century
analytic philosophy cautions against use-mention confusion [9]. Lewis Carroll illus‐
trates this in Through the Looking-Glass [10] with Alice’s confusion at the Knight’s
discussion of Haddocks’ Eyes (which uses a chain of information grounding levels). In
these cases, the typical confusion is mistaking one level for its neighbor.
In IS development, it is common to make a similar kind of mistake and talk of a
model at one time as if it modelled the system and another time as if it modelled the
information ground. The RM-ODP architecture appears to do this; the 4 + 1 architecture,
like many software focused approaches, appears to avoid consideration of the informa‐
tion ground almost entirely.
However, the problem goes deeper. Once the system is developed, the relationship
between the information ground, the system (information) and the system (information)
model is a clear case of an information grounding hierarchy. However, during devel‐
opment things are less clear. In the early stages, one works with design artefacts. One
builds the information ground model and uses this to build the system model. But what
legitimises this? The relation between the two cannot be simple grounding; the system
itself grounds the system model and the information ground model is a design artefact
– clearly not the system. The grounding relation is indirect, it is that the system infor‐
mation and the information ground model shared the same information ground, so are
in some way isomorphic. The information grounding view will need to account for this
kind of indirect isomorphic grounding.
There are other refinements that will be needed. For example, it is usual to represent
the information ground outside the system. However, there are many cases where they
overlap. (Davidson [11] makes a similar point about the use-mention distinction.)
Obvious cases are operating systems, where the objects of interest (for examples, files)
are clearly inside the system. Less obvious, but common, cases would be internet orders,
which are processed almost completely online. In these cases, the order is inside the
system. In these cases, the system information does not clearly map into a level in the
information grounding hierarchy. This leads to a requirement for a more intricate
mapping of the information grounding hierarchy onto the design models.
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3 First-Third Person Divergence
The original UoD/UoDD literature and subsequent work assumes a simple grounding
structure, where the UoDD inside the system is a simple model/description of the UoD
(in our terms, that the system information is just an information ground model).
However, the system is often an agent and as such the information content is not a simple
description – so more than simple grounding is at play. We discuss two ways it is less
simple: indexical and epistemic. There are others that need to be catered for, such as the
deontic and doxastic aspects.
In philosophy, particularly philosophy of mind there is much debate about the rela‐
tion between first and third person perspectives [12], and the reducibility of the first to
the third person. One aspect of these are the indexicals typically linked to the first person
(the most prominent being ‘I’, ‘here’ and ‘now’), whose meaning depends upon the
context of the utterance. These indexicals are also studied in philosophy of language,
where Perry [13] made a convincing argument that they are irreducible.
There seems to be a similar phenomenon in information systems. Statements giving
a person’s age are linked to the ‘now’ time of utterance – ‘Boris Johnson is 52 (now)’
is true at the time of writing, but will be false when read in a few years. A typical
information design manoeuvre is to talk about a static date of birth rather than dynamic
age. This merely pushes back the need for the ‘now’ indexical; in order to recover the
age, one needs to calculate the time between the date of birth and now. So it is no surprise
that programming languages cater for this; C#’s DateTime.Now property being an
example. In an analogous way, one may convert a mobile phone’s dynamic ‘here’ loca‐
tion into static coordinates, but one still needs the equivalent of ‘here’ to find one’s
current location.
A business application often has a requirement for designed blindness – a restriction
on its information about its domain. A topical example is name and age blindness in a
curriculum vitae register – to avoid discrimination. We call what the system knows a
‘first person epistemology’ here – it is what the application as agent is designed to know.
In [14] this is called just ‘epistemology’ and the designed blindness ‘epistemic divergence’.
Hopefully the preceding discussion has both clarified what information grounding
is and the kind of attention to detail needed to expose the underlying structure. We have
developed a view that this exemplifies a wider problem of a lack of attention to funda‐
mental meta-ontological issues that become particularly acute in gargantuan systems. It
is a common theme among metaphysicians that metaphysics is unavoidable; that most
positions involve an array of metaphysical assumptions [15, 16]. And that if one does
not make the effort to understand the choices one has made, then it is likely that they
will be uninformed, often ill-formed. This view suggests a way forward.
4 Information Grounding Architectural Framework
The way forward is to use a framework in which these metaphysical issues, including
information grounding, are explicitly addressed. One such framework is a founda‐
tional ontology; where this “defines a range of top-level domain-independent
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ontological categories, which form a general foundation for more elaborated domain-
specific ontologies” [17].
However, the mere adoption of a foundational ontology in itself is insufficient to
ensure the right level of quality. One also needs a framework from within which one
can assess the metaphysical quality; whether and how the issues have been dealt with.
Within philosophy, there is not a consensus on the ‘right’ ontology. But there is a
reasonable consensus on ways a particular ontology can be characterised. One is its
position on ontological topics such as identity or space and time. These are useful head‐
ings under which to understand an individual foundational ontology. There is also a
reasonable consensus on the range of metaphysical choices one can make. These can be
helpful when deciding between foundational ontologies, as they can help to characterise
commonalties and differences.
We have been developing a range of choices for a while. The choices (listed in
Table 1) were first published in [18], and subsequently in [19–21]. They have been
discussed in [22]. Together these texts contain a quite detailed explanation of these
choices, which we will not repeat here. There are undoubtedly refinements and additions
that could (and should) be made to this list, but we have found it a useful starting point.
Table 1. Metaphysical Choices (BORO choices highlighted)
Choice 1 Choice 2 Related Topics
Endurantism Perdurantism Existence. Change.
Eternalism Presentism Existence. Change.
Single Space-Time
Continuum
Separate Space and 
Time Continua
Change.











Identity. Can two different 










Branching Time Linear Time Existence. Possibility.
We now provide an example of how to characterise a foundational ontology using
metaphysical choices, using one we are familiar with – the BORO ontology (for an
example of how one could use the choices to compare two ontologies see [23]). It is
useful to understand the external drivers for the choices. One way to frame these is in
terms of concerns, topics and choices – we provide two examples below.
Reproducibility is key to science, one expects different scientists to be able to get
the same results when reproducing experiments. Unfortunately, in the practice of domain
modelling, there is little reproducibility of models, as expert domain modellers often
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have fundamental disagreements. This is a result, in large part, of a lack of criteria of
identity, mechanisms for understanding identity and difference.
A more stringent (and potentially more useful) desideratum is intersubjectively reli‐
able criteria of identity; a mechanism that different people can use to reliably arrive at
and agree upon the same result. This is not a new idea. Quine worried about this relia‐
bility question and this motivated his metaphysical choices. Decock [24] explores this
in some detail. BORO makes similar choices to Quine for similar reasons (BORO’s
choices are highlighted in Table 1). For example, Quine (like BORO) selects materialism
to avoid abstract objects which are notoriously difficult to agree on. Like Quine, BORO
settles on a four-dimensional spatio-temporal extensional criterion of identity. Unlike
Quine (but like Lewis) BORO chooses modally flat possible worlds. Like Quine,
BORO’s types are extensional. So this single concern has motivated most of the choices.
One way to appreciate how the choices shape the foundational ontology is looking
at the tools and techniques they enable. The space-time maps used in BORO analysis
(an example in Table 1) provide a good example. Given that four-dimensional spatio-
temporal extent is a criterion of identity for particulars, then this kind of map of spatio-
temporal extents is a way of characterising their identity (Fig. 1).
Fig. 1. An example of a BORO space-time map
This provides a clear way of visualising the ontological commitment, though one
only available within a foundational ontology that has made these specific choices. Each
object will occupy an area on the map (while objects can overlap no two objects can
occupy the same exact area) – so one can unequivocally count the objects. One can also
visualise mereological relations – overlaps and containments are clearly visible. This is
analogous to the way Venn and Euler diagrams diagrammatically reason [25] over
extensional sets, the way the spatial arrangement captures the identity criteria. Given
BORO’s space-time maps work with similar extensional identity criteria, then they could
also be seen as a form of diagrammatical reasoning (see also Casati and Varzi’s [26]
Chapter 11 for the semantics of maps – though these are only spatial, they share some
extensional characteristics).
5 Summary
We have highlighted the need for an information grounding view in IS architectures
when working with gargantuan systems. We showed how this view reveals intricacies
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central to the structure of the IS development process that are missed by contemporary
efforts. We have proposed foundational ontologies as architectures for the information
grounding approach and shown how metaphysical choices can be used to assess them.
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